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INTUITIONISM AND THE LIAR PARADOX
NIK WEAVER
Abstract. The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intu-
itionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However,
a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction
blocks the contradiction. This leads to a general resolution of the classical
semantic paradoxes.
This paper is an expanded version of parts of [10].
1. Informal proof
1.1. Validity of informal proofs. The concept of a mathematical proof is im-
portant in intuitionism. We think of proofs as objects, and it is supposed to be
decidable whether a given object is or is not a valid proof.
Here “proof” does not necessarily mean “formal proof”. It is indeed decidable,
in the sense of computability theory, whether a given finite sequence of formulas
constitutes a proof within a given recursive formal system; but that isn’t what is
meant. The issue is not syntactic correctness of formal proofs, but rather semantic
correctness of informal proofs.
This probably sounds rather vague. Why not just agree that “valid mathematical
proof” means “proof that can be formalized in ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
the generally accepted axiom system for mathematics)”?
1.2. Going beyond a given formal system. Unfortunately, this proposal leads
to a dilemma. Do we really know that the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms are valid? If
so, then we should be able to infer that ZFC is consistent, i.e., 0 = 1 is not a
theorem. (More precisely, we should be able to infer a number theoretic sentence
that arithmetically expresses in a standard way the consistency of ZFC.) But by
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, this is not provable within ZFC (assuming
ZFC is, in fact, consistent). So if we know that the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms are
valid then we can infer, informally but correctly, a statement that can’t be proven
within ZFC. Adding this statement to ZFC then yields a stronger formal system
that we still know to be valid.
The other horn of the dilemma is that if we don’t know whether the Zermelo-
Fraenkel axioms are valid, then there are proofs executable in ZFC whose validity
is in question. So either way, we cannot regard ZFC as exactly capturing all valid
informal reasoning.
The point is not specific to ZFC. Any formal system S that might be proposed
as exactly modelling all valid informal reasoning would be subject to the same
complaint. Either we don’t know that the axioms of S are valid, in which case S
manifestly fails to achieve its goal, or we do know that they are valid, in which case
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we can go beyond S. We can strengthen it by augmenting it with an assertion of
its consistency.
What all this tells us is that we’re dealing with a free-floating concept of “valid
proof” that not only isn’t thought of as being tied to any particular formal system, it
actually can’t be exactly modelled by any formal system. The concept is inherently
unformalizable. To be sure, it can be partially formalized: we can produce formal
systems that do capture some aspects of valid informal reasoning — maybe even,
for practical purposes, all important aspects. But we can always go beyond any
given partial formalization.
1.3. Is the proof concept meaningful? At this point one could ask why we have
to accept that this informal notion of “valid mathematical proof” is even coherent.
The fact that it can’t be formalized seems like good evidence that it simply isn’t
meaningful. But if we had no overarching notion of validity, all that would be left
would be the syntactic notion of validity internal to a given formal system. We
would then have to conclude that mathematics is nothing but a meaningless formal
game with symbols.
Surely most mathematicians believe, for example, that there really are infinitely
many prime numbers, and that Euclid’s proof of this fact is not merely valid in the
trivial sense of being syntactically correct within some formal system, it is valid in
a general semantic sense. For this to be the case we need to have a general semantic
notion of proof validity.
1.4. Indefinite extensibility. So, regardless of how we feel about intuitionism,
unless we’re going to be hardcore formalists it would seem that we have to accept
as meaningful the informal notion of semantic validity of mathematical proofs. The
problem then becomes, perhaps, a psychological one: how to come to terms with
the fact that we have to deal with a concept that can only be partially formalized.
Michael Dummett’s ideas about “indefinitely extensible” concepts may be help-
ful here. According to Dummett ([1], p. 441) there is a whole category of concepts
which have a special kind of productive quality that he calls indefinite extensibility.
By this he means that whenever we’ve precisely circumscribed some definite collec-
tion of individuals falling under such a concept, it will always be possible to find a
new individual falling under the concept that wasn’t captured. This is exactly what
we just observed about informal proofs: any partial formalization can be extended.
So “valid proof” is an indefinitely extensible concept.
But it isn’t the only one. Dummett would also say that the concept “set” is
indefinitely extensible. And we can point to other familiar concepts that have the
same kind of productive quality (e.g., “truth”, “definition”). So if we buy into the
idea of indefinitely extensible concepts then we may come to feel that our inability
to formalize the notion “valid mathematical proof” is not a defect of that notion,
but simply an expression of the fact that it’s indefinitely extensible. To put this
another way, we ought to be comfortable with the concept “valid proof”, despite
the fact that it’s only capable of partial formalization, to the same degree that
we’re comfortable with the concept “set”, which is also only capable of partial
formalization. (The truths of first order set theory are not recursively enumerable.)
How is it possible to reason about indefinitely extensible concepts? It seems hard
to get one’s hands on such a slippery notion. Dummett’s answer to this question
is that we need to use intuitionistic logic when we’re working with assertions that
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quantify over an indefinitely extensible concept. This point is debatable and I will
return to it later in the paper.
1.5. The provable liar paradox. So far, we’ve done the following. We intro-
duced the informal notion of “valid proof”, observed that it cannot be formalized,
convinced ourselves that we nonetheless need this concept if we are to avoid hard-
core formalism, and (perhaps) mollified our concerns about its unformalizability by
placing it in the general setting of indefinitely extensible concepts.
But there’s another problem: the informal notion of proof seems to be directly
implicated in paradoxes. Specifically, if we accept that there is a meaningful free-
floating notion of proof that is not attached to any particular formal system, then
it is hard to see why we can’t formulate a sentence that asserts of itself that it is
not provable in this free-floating, informal sense:
L = “This sentence is not provable.”
This sentence is paradoxical in the same way as the usual liar sentence. But recall
that Dummett tells us to use intuitionistic logic, in which the law of excluded middle
(A ∨ ¬A, for all formulas A) is not assumed. In particular, we are not forced to
accept the dichotomy “either L is provable or L is not provable”; maybe this is the
key to evading the paradox? Unfortunately, no. It is easy to see that we can deduce
a contradiction using pure intuitionistic logic, without invoking excluded middle.
(First check that assuming L is provable leads to a contradiction, then infer from
this that L is not provable. This is a proof that L is not provable, and hence it is
a proof of L. So L is provable, which leads to a contradiction.)
To my mind this is a very serious problem for the informal notion of proof. The
direct involvement of this notion in a paradox seems like an excellent reason to
suppose that it is not meaningful.
(True, the informal “set” concept is also apparently paradoxical. But this para-
dox is resolved by recognizing that the “set” concept is indefinitely extensible. The
general principle would be that we can form the set of x such that P (x) only for
ordinary predicates P , not indefinitely extensible ones. In the specific case of Rus-
sell’s paradox, for example, there is no such thing as the set of all sets that aren’t
members of themselves, precisely because the concept “set that is not a member
of itself” is indefinitely extensible. There is no analogous resolution of the liar
paradox.)
2. Proof as a heuristic concept
2.1. A mistake. I’m not going to mount a defense of the intuitionist’s proof con-
cept against this new attack. I agree with the criticism. I think that the informal
notion of valid mathematical proof, as it is characterized in traditional intuitionism,
is indeed incoherent. The proof of this is the fact that it leads directly to paradox.
What I want to do instead is, first, to identify what I think is a mistake intu-
itionists have made, and second, to show how correcting this mistake defuses the
paradox. Then I’ll conclude by making a case that this also settles the usual liar
paradox which is based on truth rather than provability.
The intuitionist’s mistake is something I mentioned at the beginning of the pa-
per, the assumption that proof validity is decidable. This seems to me to run
firmly against general intuitionistic ideas. Consider that intuitionists would say
that we cannot, at present, affirm that Goldbach’s conjecture has a definite truth
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value. In order to do this, they would argue, we would need either (1) a proof of
the conjecture, (2) a counterexample, or (3) at a minimum, a procedure which is
guaranteed to terminate after a finite number of steps and produce one of the first
two items. If we don’t have a finite procedure that will produce either a proof or a
counterexample, we can’t assert that the conjecture has a definite truth value.
Now suppose we are given what appears to be an informal proof of Goldbach’s
conjecture. How would we check it? Do we have a finite procedure that will, in
principle, infallibly assess the validity of any potential informal proof? If not, then
it would seem that we can’t affirm that the statement “p is a valid proof” has a
definite truth value for all p without violating intuitionistic principles.
Of course, if we’re talking about formal proofs, then we do have such a procedure.
But the whole point of considering informal proofs is that this takes us beyond
formal proofs in any specified formal system. Decidability becomes an issue if the
purported proof requires not just the axioms of some accepted base system (Peano
arithmetic, say) but additional principles which might or might not informally
follow in some way from the accepted axioms. For instance, along the lines we
discussed above, if we recognize the Peano axioms as valid then we can accept not
only Peano arithmetic (PA), but also the stronger system
PA′ = PA+ Con(PA),
where Con(PA) is a number theoretic sentence that arithmetically expresses in a
standard way the consistency of PA. Then we can go one step further and accept
PA′′ = PA′ +Con(PA′),
and so on. This process can be iterated any finite number of steps, and (with
minor technical complication) even beyond that into the transfinite [6, 2]. (In
particular, a simple informal induction argument can lead us to accept PA(n) for
all n.) Just how far we can go is a subtle question, and it apparently cannot be
decidable, as this would contradict indefinite extensibility of the “proof” concept.
If we could algorithmically decide which systems PA(α) we can accept, then we
could formulate a single system whose theorems are precisely the theorems of all
the acceptable PA(α), and we could then go beyond it.
Troeltra ([5], p. 7) suggests that we can, in effect, build decidability into our
informal notion of proof, by stipulating that p does not count as a proof unless we
have no doubt that it is a proof. The problem with this idea is that it assumes we
can decide whether there is any doubt about whether p is a proof. In other words,
it simply shifts the assumption of decidability onto a different predicate, where it
is equally unfounded.
2.2. Heuristic concepts. Let’s grant that proof validity is not decidable and see
what the consequences are.
First, we need a new name. We can no longer say that the “valid proof” concept
is indefinitely extensible since this term, in Dummett’s usage, implies decidability.
I will say that the informal concept of proof is heuristic [8]. The point is that if C
is an indefinitely extensible concept then we can always produce new individuals
that fall under C by going beyond the current repertoire of available individuals,
but our understanding of what it means to fall under C does not change. If C is
heuristic, on the other hand, then one way to enlarge the pool of individuals falling
under C is to induct previously available individuals by expanding our conception
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of what it means to fall under C. In the same way that Goldbach’s conjecture
could change its status from “not known to have a truth value” to, say, “true”, an
existing potential proof of Goldbach’s conjecture could change its status from “not
known to be valid or invalid” to, say, “valid”.
We’ve already balked at the prospect of dealing with concepts that can’t be fully
formalized, but were at least decidable. Now we’re going one step further. Is it
possible to reason in any way with heuristic concepts, or is this category just too
vague to be dealt with at all?
2.3. Natural deduction. It’s easiest to get at this question using natural deduc-
tion. This is a system of deduction rules which directly express the meanings of
the logical symbols (see, e.g., [4]). For instance, one rule states that given A we
can deduce A ∨B.
We adopt the intuitionistic “proof interpretation” of the logical symbols. This
means that a proof of A ∧ B is by definition a proof of A together with a proof of
B, a proof of A ∨ B is either a proof of A or a proof of B, and so on. Under this
interpretation, is it fair to deduce A ∨B from A? That is, if there is a proof of A,
can we legitimately infer that there is a proof of A∨B, i.e., a proof of A or a proof
of B?
Clearly the answer is: yes, this is a legitimate inference. The possibility that
there may be cases where we cannot decide whether we have a proof ofA is irrelevant
to the question since the premise of this inference is that there definitely is a proof
of A.
At the risk of belaboring the point, we could make a similar inference for any
concept. If there is a wixle of A then we may correctly infer that there is a wixle
of A or a wixle of B. As long as “wixle” is a meaningful concept, this is legitimate
regardless of what “wixle” actually means, and even if the predicate “is a wixle” is
not decidable.
What about the other rules of natural deduction? For example, the modus
ponens rule states that we may infer B from the two hypotheses A and A → B.
Under the proof interpretation of the logical symbols, a proof of A → B is a
procedure that converts any proof of A into a proof of B. So is modus ponens
justified if proof is heuristic? Yes. In general, if there is a wixle of A and there is
a procedure that converts any wixle of A into a wixle of B, then there is a wixle of
B. Once again, this in no way makes use of any assumption about decidability of
the “wixle” concept.
It begins to look as though dropping the assumption of decidability does not
have any dramatic effects.
2.4. Circularity. There is one important consequence, however: if the “proof”
concept is heuristic then we cannot proceed from the assumption that all proofs
are valid.
Suppose “proof” is decidable. That is, it is a completely definite concept all
of whose properties are determined in advance. One of these properties is that
anything that counts as a proof must be valid. So as we identify and adopt various
axioms and deduction rules, we can legitimately make use of the fact that all proofs
establish correct conclusions. We may use this fact to help ourselves identify which
axioms and rules are valid, if it is of any help.
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If “proof” is merely heuristic, on the other hand, then our adoption of axioms
and deduction rules should be seen in a very different light. We are not merely
identifying the properties of an already definite “proof” concept, we are building
up the concept itself. In this case it is not reasonable to assume that all proofs will
ultimately turn out to be valid. If that assumption in any way feeds into our choice
of which axioms and rules to adopt, it would be circular because we could end up
adopting an axiom or rule for reasons which hinge on the correctness of proofs that
themselves use the axiom or rule in question.
An analogy may help here. Suppose we accept the validity of Peano arithmetic.
Then we can also accept the stronger system
PA′ = PA+ Con(PA).
But what about a system like
PA∗ = PA+ Con(PA∗)?
It is easy, using Go¨dellian self-reference techniques, to formulate a sentence
Con(PA∗) that arithmetically expresses the consistency of PA augmented by the
sentence Con(PA∗) itself. However, this stronger assertion is incorrect. Since PA∗
proves its own consistency, we know from the second incompleteness theorem that
it is inconsistent. Thus Con(PA∗) can be disproven within PA.
What went wrong? We are free to adopt a new principle that acknowledges the
consistency of previously adopted principles. But in general we cannot adopt a
new principle whose correctness hinges on the correctness of the system as a whole,
including the new principle that is being adopted. That would be circular.
Again, if “proof” were decidable then this would not be an issue. There would be
nothing wrong in assuming the global correctness of the “proof” concept, if doing
so would help us to identify which proof principles are valid. But if “proof” is
heuristic then there is a very real danger of circularity in such an assumption. We
cannot adopt any axiom or deduction rule whose justification implicitly assumes
the global validity of all proofs, including proofs that might make use of the new
axiom or rule under consideration.
2.5. Ex falso quodlibet. How could such an assumption arise? We can give a
simple example involving the “ex falso quodlibet” law which states that anything
follows from a contradiction.
Before I make this point, let me acknowledge that there are many settings in
which the ex falso law is legitimate. It is commonly accepted, for example, that in
the setting of first order arithmetic we can give a direct argument that any formula
follows from 0 = 1.
I have elsewhere argued that this fact generalizes to any system that proves the
law of excluded middle for all atomic formulas; see Section 2.3 of [9]. That is, ex
falso is valid if all of the basic concepts in play are decidable.
But is it universally valid? There are several possible ways one could try to
justify this conclusion. I want to consider the following argument, which I will call
the justification by vacuity:
“For any formula A, the assertion 0 = 1→ A means that there is a
procedure which will convert any proof of 0 = 1 into a proof of A.
But there are no proofs of 0 = 1, so this is vacuously the case: for
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any formula A, the null procedure will convert any proof of 0 = 1
into a proof of A. Thus 0 = 1 → A.”
(This is paraphrased from [7].) On its face, the argument is persuasive. The catch
is that in order for it to work we must know that there is no proof of 0 = 1, and
this hinges on the global correctness of all proofs. The justification by vacuity is
circular because its justification of the ex falso law assumes that no proof, including
proofs that might make use of the ex falso law, establishes 0 = 1.
There may be some other way to universally justify ex falso; I don’t think so, but
that is not important here. The only point I want to make is that the justification
by vacuity exhibits the kind of circularity that we have identified as illegitimate. It
is a textbook example of an attempted justification which is circular in the manner
discussed above.
2.6. An objection. Readers of [10], where this analysis was first presented, have
objected that the circularity I identify in ex falso is no worse than related, or
possibly identical, circularities which are present in all of the standard deduction
rules. For example, in some sense the rule “given A, infer A∨B” is circular because
a proof which establishes A may itself have employed this rule. So don’t we need
to assume the global correctness of all proofs in order to justify this rule too? And
couldn’t the same be said of any of the rules of natural deduction?
No. First of all, the alleged circularity present in the rule “infer A ∨B from A”
is not the same as the circularity we have identified in the justification of ex falso
discussed above. This can easily be seen by applying the “wixle” test: would either
justification still be valid if we replaced “proof” with “wixle”, where “wixle” could
be any meaningful concept? Consider:
(1) if there is a wixle of A then there is a wixle of A or a wixle of B
(2) any wixle of 0 = 1 can be converted into a wixle of A.
We don’t need to know anything about wixles to be sure that if there is a wixle of
A then there is a wixle of A or a wixle of B. But we do need to know something
about wixles to be sure that any wixle of 0 = 1 can be converted into a wixle of A,
for arbitrary A. Namely, in order for the justification by vacuity to work, we would
need to know that there are no wixles of 0 = 1. If “wixle” means “proof”, then this
means that we require the global correctness (or at least consistency) of all proofs.
This is where the circularity comes in. There is a circularity in the justification of
(2) which is not present in the justification of (1).
In order to clarify this distinction, we need to understand better just what is
wrong with circularity. The danger to avoid is a justification of X that implicitly
assumes that X is correct. This would beg the question, and such a justification is
not to be trusted. That is why we must reject any justification of a proof technique
that assumes the global correctness of all proofs. If the justification succeeds, then
“all proofs” would include proofs that make use of the technique in question, so that
the assumption of global correctness of proofs would have presumed the correctness
of the technique which was supposedly being justified. This is how circularity can
be dangerous.
Given an attempt to justify a proof principle X , a simple way to test for this
kind of circularity is to ask the question, “If X were not correct, but we nonetheless
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admitted proofs which made use of X , would this affect the validity of the justifi-
cation?” If it would, then the justification is dangerously circular; if not, then the
justification is not circular in any critical way.
So suppose the inference “A entails A ∨ B” were not generally valid, but we
nonetheless admitted proofs that made use of this inference. Would this affect the
correctness of the reasoning that if there is a proof of A then there is a proof of
A or a proof of B? No, that trivial reasoning would still be valid. “If there is a
wixle of A then there is either a wixle of A or a wixle of B” works just as well if
“wixle” is a defective “proof” concept. Now suppose the inference “0 = 1 entails
A” were not generally valid, but we nonetheless admitted proofs that made use
of this inference. Would this affect the correctness of the justification by vacuity?
Yes, it would, because proofs which made use of ex falso might not be correct, and
hence could conceivably establish 0 = 1. But the existence of proofs of 0 = 1 would
invalidate the justification by vacuity. I do not see how I can make it any clearer
that justification by vacuity requires the global validity of proofs in a way that the
justifications of the other deduction rules do not.
2.7. Modus ponens. A more interesting objection that I would rather have seen
specifically targets modus ponens. Given a proof of A and a procedure that con-
verts any proof of A into a proof of B, we may obtain a proof of B — but only if
the procedure works. There could be a circularity issue here. Perhaps the concept
“procedure that successfully converts proofs into proofs” is heuristic. Moreover,
perhaps we can make use of valid proofs to help construct successful proof conver-
sion procedures. Then the validity of modus ponens would require that all proof
conversion procedures succeed, which would in turn require the validity of all proofs,
including proofs that made use of modus ponens.
This is a plausible objection, but it is not critical because the variety of proof
conversion procedures that are actually needed in typical formal systems is quite
limited. For instance, one such procedure is “given a proof of A and a proof of B
that assumes A, append the latter to the former to produce a proof of B”. If we
possess a proof of B assuming A, we can use this procedure to convert any proof of
A into a proof of B. This is what justifies the natural deduction rule which allows us
to deduce A→ B from the existence of a proof of B that assumes A. It could also
happen that the justification of some nonlogical axiom involving implication might
require the use of some other more special kind of proof conversion procedure. For
instance, in order to justify transitivity of equality,
x = y ∧ y = z → x = z,
we need a procedure which will convert a proof of x = y together with a proof of
y = z into a proof of x = z. One such procedure is: first give the proof of x = y,
then give the proof of y = z with every occurence of y replaced by x.
Other nonlogical axioms might require other special proof conversion techniques.
But generally speaking, in order to justify the axioms of any particular formal
system we would never need to invoke an open-ended notion of “proof conversion
procedure”. Modus ponens could always be saved by restricting A → B to mean
“there is a procedure [of some definite type] which will convert any proof of A into
a proof of B”.
2.8. Minimal logic. The basic rules of natural deduction for minimal logic are:
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(1) given A and B, deduce A ∧B;
(2) given A ∧B, deduce A and B;
(3) given either A or B, deduce A ∨B;
(4) given A ∨B, a proof of C from A, and a proof of C from B, deduce C;
(5) given a proof of B from A, deduce A→ B;
(6) given A and A→ B, deduce B.
(There are also rules for quantifiers; see [4] for a fuller and more precise account.)
We have no special axioms for negation because we interpret ¬A to mean A→ 0 =
1. Intuitionistic logic is minimal logic plus ex falso; classical logic is intuitionistic
logic plus excluded middle.
From what we have said above, minimal logic is suitable for reasoning about
heuristic concepts, in particular for reasoning about provability. Ex falso might
also be justified in such a setting, but it is not clear that this will always be the
case.
Excluded middle is generally not a valid assumption when heuristic concepts are
in play. This conclusion is already argued by Dummett when one has to deal with
assertions which quantify over indefinitely extensible concepts. But the problem for
heuristic concepts is much more severe. Indeed, in the indefinitely extensible case,
the concepts are assumed to be decidable and so we do have excluded middle for all
atomic formulas. The only question is whether we can accept it for formulas that
quantify over an indefinitely extensible concept. This would appear to depend on
how we interpret truth: under the proof interpretation, excluded middle is dubious
because there is no reason to assume that every such formula is in principle provable
or disprovable. Since the concept is indefinitely extensible there is no question
of being able, even in principle, to verify such formulas in any mechanical way.
The only way to assess the truth of formulas with quantification is by deductive
reasoning, and generally speaking it seems unlikely that the truth value of every
formula could be determined in this way. So interpreting “true” as “provable in
principle” probably renders excluded middle invalid.
However, I do not see anything wrong with a classical interpretation of truth —
taking “true” to mean “is the case” rather than “is provable” — in the indefinitely
extensible setting, and this would support the law of excluded middle. In any case,
at a technical level it seems likely that we could generally justify excluded middle
by replacing each indefinitely extensible concept with a definite subconcept. For
instance, in set theory replace “set” by “set of accessible rank”. Or, if inaccessible
cardinalities are in play, go to some larger cardinal. Broadly speaking, there should
always be a cutoff that transcends any previously specified method of construction.
Thus, we should generally be able to justify excluded middle by reinterpreting the
system in a definite “toy” universe.
Heuristic settings are radically different. Even when working within a definite
“toy” universe it may be impossible to pin down exactly which individuals fall
under a given heuristic concept. For example, consider the heuristic notion of
“definability” and the purported definition
the smallest natural number not definable in ten English words
(Berry’s paradox). Even restricting to the finite set of all ten word long strings, we
still arrive at a paradox if we suppose that every such string definitely either does
or does not define a natural number. So assuming the law of excluded middle when
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reasoning about heuristic concepts may be not merely unjustified, but actually
inconsistent.
3. The liar paradox
3.1. Reasoning about provability. We can now resolve the provability version
of the liar paradox discussed earlier. Suppose we want to reason about provability
itself. We introduce a predicate Prov(pAq) signifying that there is a proof of the
formula A with Go¨del number pAq. Not a proof within any particular formal
system, but a semantically valid proof in an informal sense.
Since “proof” is heuristic, classical logic will not be appropriate here. Ex falso
might be justifiable, but excluded middle presumably is not.
Which nonlogical axioms can we adopt? Is it legitimate to assume A ↔
Prov(pAq)? Recall that we are using the proof interpretation of the logical symbols,
so that this means that any proof of A can be converted into a proof that there is
a proof of A, and vice versa. One implication is valid: given a proof p of A, we can
prove that there is a proof of A by exhibiting p. If p really is a proof of A then it
should be possible to verify this. In other words, we reject the possibility of a valid
proof whose validity, in principle, could never be recognized. Thus, we can accept
the axiom
A→ Prov(pAq).
In the reverse direction, can we convert any proof that A has a proof into a
proof of A? Here is an argument suggesting that we can. Since we are reasoning
constructively, any proof that some object exists ought to, in principle, actually
give us a means of constructing that object. So any proof that there is a proof of A
should, if executed, actually produce a proof of A. This means that we can convert
a proof p that A is provable into a proof of A by executing p and displaying the
result.
But this argument is flawed in the same way that the justification by vacuity of
ex falso is flawed. It requires that any proof that A has a proof, including proofs
that might make use of the axiom Prov(pAq) → A, actually does produce a proof
of A. That is, it assumes the global correctness of all proofs. So we cannot adopt
the axiom Prov(pAq)→ A.
Additional axioms for provability that are straightforwardly justifiable include
Prov(pAq) ∧ Prov(pBq) ↔ Prov(pA ∧Bq)
Prov(pAq) ∨ Prov(pBq) → Prov(pA ∨Bq)
Prov(pA ∨Bq) ∧ Prov(pA→ Cq) ∧ Prov(pB → Cq) → Prov(pCq)
Prov(pAq) ∧ Prov(pA→ Bq) → Prov(pBq),
for all formulas A, B, and C. (See [10] for additional explanation.)
3.2. The provable liar. Let L be the “provable liar sentence” introduced earlier.
One way to formalize it is as L = Prov(p¬Lq). We can reason informally about
L as follows. Assume L. Then we have Prov(p¬Lq) by definition. But also, since
L→ Prov(pLq), we have Prov(pLq). Thus, we have Prov(pL∧¬Lq) and hence we
have Prov(p0 = 1q). So we have shown
L→ Prov(p0 = 1q).
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Or suppose we assume ¬L. Then the axiom scheme A → Prov(pAq) allows us
to infer Prov(p¬Lq), i.e., we can infer L. Thus, we have L∧¬L and hence we have
0 = 1. So we have shown ¬L→ 0 = 1, i.e., ¬¬L.
We have obtained real, informative conclusions about L. It entails that a con-
tradiction is provable, and its absurdity is absurd. (If the provable liar sentence
is formalized instead as L = ¬Prov(pLq), then we obtain similar results: we can
prove ¬L and ¬¬Prov(pLq).) But lacking both Prov(pAq) → A and A ∨ ¬A, we
cannot deduce a contradiction. Both restrictions are important: adding the former
as an axiom would allow the inference L → 0 = 1, i.e., we could prove ¬L, which
as we just saw leads to a contradiction. Adding the latter as an axiom would yield
Prov(p0 = 1q), since both L and ¬L entail this conclusion.
Removing the circularity inherent in adopting axioms whose justification as-
sumes the global correctness of all proofs defeats the provable liar paradox. This
conclusion is made precise in [10], where we present a formal system HT for reason-
ing about propositions involving a self-applicative provability predicate. We prove
that neither 0 = 1 nor Prov(p0 = 1q) is a theorem of HT.
3.3. Revenge. Attempts to resolve any version of the liar paradox have to deal
with the so-called “revenge problem’. Typically a resolution that may seem to
handle the original liar type sentence is defeated by a modified sentence that is
engineered for that purpose.
The resolution offered here does not suffer from any revenge problem because
we do not come to any definite conclusion about the sentence L. We neither affirm
it, nor deny it, nor assert that it can be neither affirmed nor denied. Since we lack
excluded middle we are not forced to take any of these positions. We do assert that
¬L is absurd, but lacking excluded middle, this alone does not entail L.
What we can say is that if L were the case then there would be a proof of 0 = 1.
But we cannot infer from this that L is not the case, precisely because we are not
in a position to definitely affirm that there is no proof of 0 = 1. We discussed the
illegitimacy of this assumption at some length; now we see that not being able to
prove that we reason consistently, i.e., not being able to prove ¬Prov(p0 = 1q),
is fortunate. If we could prove this then we could combine that result with the
formula
L→ Prov(p0 = 1q)
derived above to infer ¬L, and from this obtain a contradiction.
We know that neither 0 = 1 nor Prov(p0 = 1q) is a theorem of the formal system
HT, which is supposed to model valid informal reasoning about provability. How-
ever, this does not ensure that there is no proof of 0 = 1, since HT is, necessarily,
only a partial formalization of valid informal reasoning.
3.4. The classical liar paradox. Does our resolution of the provable liar paradox
also apply to the classical liar paradox framed in terms of truth?
It does if we identify “true” with “provable”, but this is dubious because prov-
ability is heuristic and our basic intuition about truth tells us that it is completely
sharp. A sentence is true if and only if what it asserts is the case, and provided we’re
talking about a sentence that has a definite meaning, that seems like a completely
sharp question.
The qualification that the sentence have a definite meaning is a key point, because
until we define the word “true” any sentence that refers to this concept evidently
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does not have a definite meaning. It follows that it would be circular to use
a sentence is true ⇔ what it asserts is the case (∗)
as a definition of truth for sentences that themselves contain the word “true”.
There are two basic ways of dealing with this circularity. One, due to Tarski,
is to introduce a sequence of words {truen} and apply (∗) inductively, so that a
sentence is truen if (1) it does not contain the word “truek” for any k ≥ n, and
(2) what it asserts is the case. We get around the problem of circularity by using
a heirarchy of truth predicates, each of which evaluates sentences that only involve
truth predicates at lower levels. The other possibility is Kripke’s suggestion to work
with a single truth predicate but use (∗) to define its range in stages. So at stage
0 we define what it means for sentences that don’t contain the word “true” to be
true, at stage 1 we define the truth of sentences that at worst refer to the truth of
stage 0 sentences, and so on. This leads to a general notion of “groundedness” and
a reasonable definition of truth for grounded sentences. The liar sentence
“This sentence is not true.”
is an example of an ungrounded assertion, where attempting to evaluate its truth
value leads to an infinite loop, rather than terminating after finitely many stages
as would be the case for a grounded assertion.
Both approaches are interesting and valuable, but both leave something to be
desired as a general explication of truth. Tarski’s solution doesn’t do justice to our
intuition of truth as a unitary notion. In particular, we have a clear sense that any
sentence that is truen for some n is, in fact, really true. Besides, we want to be
able to say things like
The liar sentence is not truen for any n.
but according to Tarski this sentence does not have a truth value. At any rate, it
isn’t truen for any n. Kripke’s solution is subject to a similar objection (as Kripke
acknowledges; see pp. 714-715 of [3]): we want to say
The liar sentence is not true, indeed it is not even grounded.
but this sentence itself is not grounded and hence has no truth value in Kripke’s
scheme.
The preceding should make it clear that truth in a general setting, which includes
consideration of sentences that themselves refer to truth, does not have the “abso-
lute” quality that it does seem to have in limited settings where it is applied to a
restricted class of assertions, each of which has a preexisting well-defined meaning.
Instead, it has a heuristic quality. Any partial definition of truth can always be
extended further using (∗).
The truth theories of Tarski and Kripke are unfaithful to our informal notion
of truth, since both deny truth values to assertions which are intuitively true. In
contrast, equating truth with provability matches our intuition perfectly in both
cases: under this interpretation, we may affirm that the liar sentence is neither
grounded nor truen for any n, since we can easily give informal proofs of these
facts.
The objection that provability is heuristic while truth is definite is no longer per-
suasive. To the objection that intuitionistic provability is not adequate to account
for mathematical truth, we reply that the substantive weakness of intuitionistic
mathematics has less to do with the use of intuitionistic logic than it has to do
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with the traditional intuitionistic rejection of a completed infinity. The latter is not
relevant to our treatment of the liar paradox; if we accept the idea of a completed
infinity then we may also accept the possibility of infinite proofs. All that matters
is that we have some coherent notion of provability and that it is heuristic. It need
not be finitary in any sense.
At any rate, if we equate truth with provability then the standard liar paradox
will have the same satisfying resolution as the provable liar paradox. It is satis-
fying because it is philosophically well-motivated, it allows us to draw interesting
conclusions about the liar sentence (L→ Prov(p0 = 1q) and ¬¬L), and it is tech-
nically substantive (HT does not prove 0 = 1 or Prov(p0 = 1q), as we show in [10]).
Moreover, as explained in [10], we can give related resolutions of the paradoxes of
Berry and Grelling-Nelson.
On the other hand, we are free to define “true” however we like and there are
certainly settings in which Tarskian or Kripkean definitions are desirable. If we
adopt either of those definitions then the revenge problem should perhaps simply
be ignored. Although we can informally prove that the liar sentence is neither
grounded nor truen for any n, this doesn’t matter because truth is not equated
with provability.
If that conclusion is unsatisfying, this is a testament to the strength of our
intuition that truth at the broadest level really is equatable with provability.
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